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John Locke was a seminal figure in political philosophy and political economy and this year 
marks the tercentenary of his death.  The paper focuses on the classical liberal interpretation of 
Locke.  In this view, Locke defends individualism, natural rights (especially to property) and 
minimal government.  After sketching this interpretation, I will present some extensions and 
applications of that interpretation.  With this background in mind, I then turn to the views of 
critics who have claimed that Locke’s individualism has been exaggerated and that Lockean 
rights are not absolute (they must be balanced against duties).  Then I address the view of those 
who see Locke as a defender not of minimal government but of a more muscular (albeit limited) 
government.  I then provide a brief conclusion. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
John Locke died in 1704 and this paper considers his legacy for 2004.  With the exception of 
Christianity, I will discuss neither the influences on Locke’s thinking nor the context of his 
times.  The primary questions are: Was Locke influential on political thought?  What principles 
underpinned his political thought?  Because of the controversy over the ‘true nature’ of Locke’s 
principles, further questions arise: Were Locke’s ‘true’ principles the foundation upon which 
his purported influence rested?  Are these ‘true’ principles relevant today?  
 
First, let me comment on the extent of Locke’s influence.  Macpherson says that Locke was one 
of the first to establish the ‘title-deeds’ to ‘the Western liberal constitutional state’ (1980, p.vii).  
Fukuyama states that ‘the oldest and most durable liberal societies--those in the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition, like England, the United States, and Canada--have typically understood themselves in 
Lockean terms’ (Fukuyama 1992, p.145).  Louis Hartz has claimed that the entire history of 
American thought is Lockean (Hartz 1955; see also Mansfield 1993, p.290).  Clearly there is a 
widespread belief that Locke’s writings have been influential. 
 
Second, although some suggestions have been made already about the principles adopted by 
Locke, we need to consider the matter further.  As two public policy think tanks have been 
named after Locke, it is useful to begin by considering what they say.   
 
The Locke Institute, a public policy think tank based in Virginia, USA, is active in the 
promotion of ‘classical liberalism’ in general and the ideas of Locke in particular.  The Institute 
claims that it ascribes to his ‘theory that society is based on the law of nature and that the 
individual is the ultimate source of political sovereignty’ (Locke Institute 2004).  It ‘endorses 
Locke’s proposition that individuals are possessed of inalienable rights to life, liberty, and 
property.  It is the principal function of the state to uphold these rights since free individuals 
otherwise would not enter into political society’ (Locke Institute 2004).  This think-tank is run 
primarily by economists and it focuses on ‘property rights, public choice, law and economics, 
and the new institutional economics’ (Locke Institute 2004).  The Director General is Charles 
Rowley (Professor of Economics at George Mason University and an editor of the journal 
Public Choice) whose work will be discussed below. 
 
Another think tank is also named after Locke.  The John Locke Foundation focuses on the 
situation within the American state of North Carolina.  The Foundation claims that North 
Carolina (and presumably the USA as a whole) must ‘return to our founding principles.’  There 
are four of these principles.  First, ‘We are a land of liberty where natural rights of individuals 
precede and supersede the power of the state.’  Second, ‘We are a constitutional republic in 
which government power is limited and employed for the purpose of providing legitimate 
public goods.’  Third, ‘We are a free market.’ Fourth, ‘we are a free society,’ in which various 
civil society actors play a major role in addition to government (John Locke Foundation 2004). 2 
Obviously these two think tanks share many views about Locke and his relevance for today.  
Their view is captured in Rowley’s self-description as a classical liberal (1993b, pp. 4-5).  They 
are largely consistent with the more philosophical view expressed by Nozick, who calls himself 
a ‘libertarian’ (1974, p.ix).  Others with similar views call themselves modern ‘contractarians.’  
We will generally refer to these theorists as ‘classical liberals.’  A three-point summary of their 
interpretation of Locke is that he advocates individualism, natural rights (especially rights to 
private property) and minimal government.   
 
The ‘classical liberal’ view of Locke has been endorsed and disputed by others who do not 
share this perspective.  Much of the classical liberal interpretation has been accepted by 
Marxists and by Straussians (who tend to adopt a politically-conservative outlook).  On the 
other hand, each of the three fundamental claims about Locke mentioned above has been 
disputed.  Thus, in addition to presenting the classical liberal interpretation, I will also present 
some of the points on which this view has been challenged.   
 
The remainder of the paper has five sections.  The second section sketches the classical liberal 
interpretation of Locke.  The third section presents some extensions and applications of that 
interpretation.  The fourth section addresses the views of critics who have claimed that Locke’s 
individualism has been exaggerated and that Lockean rights are not absolute (they must be 
balanced against duties).  The fifth section addresses the view of those who see Locke as a 
defender not of minimal government but of a more muscular (albeit limited) government.  The 
final section provides a brief conclusion. 
 
 
2. THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL INTERPRETATION 
 
This section presents some key points in the classical liberal interpretation of Locke.  I will 
follow the sketch provided by Rowley (1993a and 1993b) which, to some degree, follows 
Nozick (1974).  As stated above, the focus is on individualism, (natural) rights and minimal 
government.   
 
For Locke there is a state of nature which precedes civil society; a social contract brings the 
latter to an end, or at least suspends it.  According to Rowley, both the state of nature and the 
social contract which brings it to an end are allegories (1993a, pp. 11-2).  Rowley says that the 
essence of these allegories can be disclosed in some quotations from the Second Treatise. 
 
To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider what 
state all men are naturally in, and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, 
and dispose of their possessions, and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the 
law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. (Locke 
1988, 269 quoted in Rowley 1993a, 12 original emphasis) 
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Rowley comments that the state of nature is ‘a state of liberty in the negative and not the 
positive sense of that term’ (Rowley 1993a, 12 citing Berlin 1969).  He adds that the state of 
nature is not a licentious state but one which requires that no one ‘harm another in his life, 
health, liberty or possessions’ (Rowley 1993a, p.12; see Locke 1988, p.271).
1  Elsewhere, 
Rowley adds that ‘the Lockeian state of nature’ is ‘pure anarchy.  In such a condition, man is an 
individualist’ (1993b, p.51; cf. 1993a, p.13; see Locke 1988, p.415).
2  
 
Rowley then refers to several other aspects of the allegory.  The state of nature is a state of 
peace but a state of war is never far away (Rowley 1993a, pp. 12-3).  Despite such 
inconveniences in the state of nature, however, Rowley sees many advantages in it: the state of 
nature ‘recognizes the right to property, and natural law allows any individual to use necessary 
force to enforce such rights’ (Rowley 1993a, p.13). 
 
Next, he turns to property rights.  ‘In Locke’s view, every individual has a property in his own 
person and a right to the product of his own labour’ (Rowley 1993a, p.13; see Locke 1988,  
pp. 287-8).  Further, ‘individuals create property rights out of the common pool of available 
resources by mixing their labour with such resources and thus … annexing them,’ albeit with 
one limitation (Rowley 1993a, p.13 emphasis added).  This restriction on accumulation, 
following Nozick (1974, pp. 175-82), he calls ‘the Lockeian proviso.’   
 
Rowley then quotes at length from section 27 of the Second Treatise, which describes the 
mixing process and the ‘proviso.’  Here Locke says that by mixing one’s labour with natural 
materials one can expand the ownership in one’s body to other things, providing ‘there is 
enough and as good left in common for others.’  Rowley admits that this is an unfortunate 
‘loophole that has been exploited by socialist scholars to interpret Locke as a defender of 
communitarian rather than individualistic rights’ (1993a, p.14).  Nevertheless, even if Locke 
may have slipped here, Rowley adds that: ‘it takes a Humpty Dumpty mindset to interpret 
Locke’s Two Treatises as a socialist text’ (1993a, p.14).  For Rowley, it is clear that: ‘The right 
to [private] property clearly exists in the state of nature, indeed it is derived from natural law, 
even though the individual himself, … must defend that right’ (1993a, p.14).  He then quotes at 
length from Locke: 
 
Man being born … with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all 
the rights and privileges of the law of nature … hath by nature a power, not only to 
preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts 
of other men; but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others. (Locke 1988, 
pp. 323-4 quoted in Rowley 1993a, p.14)  
 
1   In reference to property, Locke often uses the expression ‘life, liberty and estate’ (see Locke 1988, pp. 323, 
350, 353, 357, 359, 382-3, 404-5, 412).   
2   Taylor says that Locke adopts a ‘radically subjectivist view of the person’; Locke has an anti-teleological, 
hedonistic view (1989, p.172; see p.169).   4 
This completes Rowley’s discussion of individualism and rights in the state of nature, at least in 
this essay.  While we will continue his discussion shortly, let me pause to comment on the essay 
thus far.  There was no discussion of duties other than the ‘Lockean proviso’ (which was clearly 
a source of embarrassment).  More will be said about this shortly.  In any event, in the classical 
liberal view, Locke really was a rugged individualist who endorsed various natural rights but no 
duties (other than the negative duty of non-interference in the actions of others). 
 
Next, Rowley turns to the social contract.  Humans leave the state of nature and enter political 
society by agreement and the agreed terms must make them better off.  In doing so, the 
contractors agree to sacrifice their right to judge and to punish the breaches of nature, which is 
‘no mean sacrifice’ (Rowley 1993a, p.14).  ‘It will not be countenanced’ by property owners 
‘unless the political society assumes full responsibility for protecting property rights and 
punishing those who transgress upon such rights’ (Rowley 1993a, p.14; see Locke 1988, pp. 
323-4).  On the other hand, Rowley places stress on the potential to choose not to enter civil 
society: ‘For no individual can be removed from the state of nature and subjected to the 
political power of civil society without his own consent’ (1993a, p.15; see Locke 1988, p.330). 
 
Civil society requires consent but unanimity is practically impossible; thus, apparently 
approvingly, he claims that Locke’s acceptance ‘of decision rules of less than unanimity’ 
anticipates the modern contractarian views of Buchanan and Tullock (1962).  On the other 
hand, the power divested to the society (which can act without unanimity) must be severely 
limited: ‘the extent of legislative power thus acceded to must be severely limited to protect the 
property rights of those who enter into civil society’ (Rowley 1993a, p.15 emphasis added).  In 
support, he again quotes Locke: ‘The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his 
property without his own consent.  For the preservation of property being the end of 
government, … [is] that for which men enter into society’ (Locke 1988, p.360 quoted in 
Rowley 1993a, p.15).  
 
Rowley says that Locke envisages a ‘minimal state’ (1993a, p.16 emphasis added; cf. Rowley 
1993b, pp. 46-7).  The state must support the individual’s pre-political rights; this is essentially 
a negative duty: ‘In the Lockeian tradition of negative natural rights, the natural right to private 
property arguably is the most important element’ (Rowley 1993b, p.72).  Rowley says little 
about Locke’s views on the constitutional machinery which support this vision, as he thinks that 
they are inadequate.   
 
Next, we need to supplement Rowley with some information about the institutions and ethos 
which Locke claims help to constrain government.  Although government is absolute, it must 
not be arbitrary; it must proceed by general ‘standing laws, promulgated and known to the 
people… not by … decrees’; and those who decide the laws must be subject to them (Locke 
1988, p.353; see pp. 357-61, 364; Hampsher-Monk 1992, p.103).  The application of the rule of 
law, even to legislators, requires an impartial judiciary (Locke 1988, pp. 326-30, 351, 358; 
Gwyn  1965,  
pp. 71-5).  It is illegitimate for ‘government to appropriate, through taxation, the possessions of 
its subjects without their consent’ (Hampsher-Monk 1992, p.104; Locke 1988, pp. 360-1).   
With regard to taxation, Locke requires consent but Hampsher-Monk says that he makes a 5 
                    
logical slip by requiring for consent only a majority of representatives of the people (1992, 
p.104; Locke 1988, p.362). 
 
In addition to these necessary conditions and institutions, there are other requirements for ‘well 
ordered commonwealths’; something like this ideal (which is consistent with a wealthy 
commercial society) emerged in Britain after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (see Locke 1988, 
p.364; Hampsher-Monk 1992, p.105).
3  Locke recognized three powers of government: the 
legislative, the executive and the federative (Locke 1988, pp. 364-6; cf. Hampsher-Monk 1992, 
p.104).
4  For Locke, the key to the well-ordering of the regime is to be found in: ‘The 
organisational form of, and relationships between, these different functions of government’ 
(Hampsher-Monk 1992, p.106).  ‘The legislative power is morally superior’ and Locke assumes 
that it will be some kind of representative body (Hampsher-Monk 1992, p.106).  It should strive 
to serve the public good and two measures help to ensure that outcome: the body exercising the 
legislative power should operate only periodically and those who exercise such power should 
be subject to the rule of law (Locke 1988, p.364). 
 
The various functions of government should all play a role in the protection of private property.  
The legislative body should aim to protect private property rights to the greatest extent possible.  
The judiciary also must enforce property rights: the ‘industrious and rational’ individuals 
provide for public plenty and their efforts must be protected from the ‘covetousness of the 
quarrelsome and contentious’ (Locke 1988, p.291; Fukuyama 1992, p.158).  Similarly, the 
monarch/executive must not ‘pursue his own interests or … deny individuals their natural rights 
of property, and due process of law’ (Hampsher-Monk 1992, p.107).  Even the federative power 
can be viewed as a means of protecting private property. 
 
Finally, we turn to trust and the right to revolution.  The legislature and the executive exercise 
their power based on trust from the community.  Ultimately, where the people perceive that the 
government has become ‘arbitrary,’ or tyrannical, the breach of trust justifies resistance and 
even revolution (Locke 1988, pp. 361, 412-5).  Dutiful fulfilment of the relationship of trust 
may be enhanced by recognition of the right to resistance and revolution.  Strangely, although 
this would seem to be the ultimate proof of Locke’s individualism, Rowley says little on the 
right to revolution; he is more concerned with the right of secession (1993a, p.16; 1993b, p.88; 
see Grant 1987, 172-3; Coby 1988, 489-90).  Further examples of practices which Locke 
opposed or endorsed are discussed by Hampsher-Monk (1992, 103-8).  Let us briefly 
summarize our discussion in this section. 
 
3   While some of the Two Treatises was written after the revolution, Laslett claims that much of it was written 
well before that time (Laslett 1988, pp. 45-66). 
4   While Locke’s understanding of ‘legislative’ power is roughly consistent with our view today, his 
understanding of the other two powers diverges from modern notions of the separation of powers.  In Locke’s 
organization, the ‘executive’ includes the judicial power; today, however, these are treated as two separate 
‘powers.’  For Locke, the ‘federative’ power means ‘what we today describe as foreign policy or national 
security’ (Lord 2003, p.71).  Today, we include this within the executive power.  6 
                    
To a large degree, the classical liberal principles can be found in Locke.  Despite this, classical 
liberals concede that some inadequacies exist in Locke’s formulation (some extensions are 
discussed in the next section).  What may be surprising is that critics on the left and the right 
endorse much of the classical liberal interpretation.  Marxists, such as C.B. Macpherson, see 
Locke as a ‘possessive individualist’: the natural law limitations on appropriation are actually 
removed by Locke as his discussion progresses and thus he transforms the natural right to 
subsistence to ‘a natural right of unlimited appropriation’ (Macpherson 1962, p.231; see p.221).  
By subtly changing throughout his work the nature of rights and rationality, he ‘provides a 
moral foundation for bourgeois appropriation’ (Macpherson 1962, p.221).  Strauss, and his 
followers, see Locke as an individualist and a defender of natural rights but not duties. ‘Locke is 
a hedonist’; he builds ‘civil society on the “low but solid” ground of selfishness’; he transforms 
‘the right of self-preservation’ into the right to ‘comfortable self-preservation’; his theory of 
property has a ‘revolutionary character’ which attempts to justify ‘unlimited acquisition’; ‘in his 
thematic discussion of property he is silent about any duties of charity’; for Locke, the primary 
object of government is to protect the ‘the different and unequal faculties of acquiring property’  
(Strauss 1953, pp. 235-6, 245-9; see pp. 239, 243).
5  Despite this apparent consensus on what 
Locke means, later we will show that the reality is quite different.  Before doing so, however, 
let us return to the classical liberals. 
 
 
3.  EXTENSIONS AND APLICATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS INTERPRETATION 
 
In this section I discuss two themes.  As indicated previously, modern ‘Lockeans,’ like Rowley, 
are unhappy about some of Locke’s own statements; Locke must be corrected and extended.  
Some examples are discussed below.  Second, for classical liberals, properly understood (and, 
where necessary, corrected and extended) Locke’s doctrines are very relevant for today.  Some 
of these applications are discussed below.  The principles attributed to Locke in the previous 
section (and in this section) are taken and applied to modern circumstances.  In these 
applications, one may find Locke himself in disagreement.   
 
First, for the classical liberals, natural rights, and especially the natural right to property, need to 
be securely grounded and the ‘Lockean proviso’ must be overcome.  Rowley thinks that 
Locke’s own understanding of rights and especially the right to property is inadequately 
grounded.  In Rowley’s view, ‘Locke … offered a religious explanation of natural rights that a 
now much more secular intelligentsia finds hard to swallow’ (Rowley 1993a, p.13; see Rowley 
1993b, p.52).  While this suggests that he would discuss and defend the religious foundation of 
Lockean theory, Rowley does not do so (cf. Dunn 1969; Dunn 1983; Dunn 1984).  He says that 
what is required is ‘the construction of a political philosophy which judges liberty as the 
primary social and political value’ (Rowley 1993b, p.71).  Thus, he develops the secular, 
individualist foundation of rights provided by Ayn Rand (1961) and Rasmussen and Den Uyl 
(1991).  In a twist on the meaning given by Berlin to positive and negative freedom, Rowley 
says that: ‘The rights relevant to human flourishing are negative rights placing duties upon 
others designed to protect an individual’s autonomy’ (Rowley 1993b, p.72; cf. Berlin 1969).  
 
5   ‘Equality in a Lockean state therefore means something like equality of opportunity’ (Fukuyama 1992, 
p.196)  7 
These rights are natural (pre-political) and absolute (they overrule all other moral 
considerations); one’s only duty is not to interfere with the autonomy of another (1993b, p.72).  
Rowley says that what counts in a more coherent ‘Lockeian’ theory of property rights is 
freedom of action and the unimpeded capacity to transform matter: nature only offers the 
‘opportunity for the transformation of the material world’ (1993b, pp. 72-3).  In this view: 
‘since property is created through an act of transformation, even the Lockean proviso is moot 
… No one has a right to the acts of transformation of others, since there can be no pre-existing 
claims to that which does not yet exist’ (Rowley 1993b, p.73).  In short: 
 
Lockeian rights, including most importantly the right to property, are the social and 
political expression of the claim that there is no higher moral purpose, no other end to be 
served, than the individual’s self-direction.  Lockeian rights are the only meta-normative 
principles that can provide a set of moral territories necessary for the highly-
individualized and self-directed character of human flourishing. (Rowley 1993b, p.73) 
 
An understanding of private property in this way would rule out Locke’s concessions to slavery 
(see Dunn 1984, p.45; Locke 1988, pp. 387-90).  Once again, Locke must be corrected to 
ensure a coherent view of freedom.  In any event, modern classical liberals have two tasks.  
First, they must give a secular foundation to property rights.  Second, to the extent that Locke 
errs in allowing limitations on the right to property, he must be corrected; the right to unlimited 
accumulation must be secured. 
 
Finally, Rowley is unhappy with Locke’s views on the constitutional machinery required to 
secure property rights in civil society.  Locke correctly saw the need for taxes to finance the 
protective activities of government and each individual who enjoys the protection of civil 
society ‘should pay his respective proportion for its maintenance’ (Rowley 1993a, p.15; see 
Locke 1988, p.362).  Yet Rowley ends in exasperation at Locke’s failure to anticipate the threat 
that taxation posed to private property.  He says that Locke was too optimistic that the rule of 
law would prevent arbitrary seizures of property (Rowley 1993a, pp.15-6).  Locke: 
 
had little notion that a property-less majority might come to dominate the legislature and 
to use it as a vehicle for accessing the private property of others.  He had no notion 
whatsoever that representative government would ever expand beyond the role of the 
minimal state or seek to engross its subjects’ property in pursuit of grandiose social 
objectives. (Rowley 1993a, p.16; see Hampsher-Monk 1992, pp. 106-7) 
 
Locke failed to foresee ‘the potential tyranny of the majority vote’ (Rowley 1993a, p.16).   
Hence, for Rowley, what is needed is a detailed study of later thinkers, especially those ‘new 
contractarians’ writing after World War II, to establish how to respond to this failure of Locke.  
The contractarian ethic based on Locke’s principles should be retained but it needs to adapt to 
the changed circumstances of parliamentary politics.  In short, there must be constitutional 
limitations on democratic politics to secure individual property rights.  Now let us turn to some 
applications of Lockean principles to today’s situation, beginning with the ‘corrected’ version 
of Locke’s constitutionalism. 
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Clearly the language of rights has become central to global discourse after World War II.  Part 
of that discourse, especially after the collapse of the planned economies, has been ‘Lockean 
rights’ in the classical liberal sense.  Obviously, securing private property is particularly 
important in countries undergoing transition from a planned economy to a capitalist economy.
6  
Entrenching rights to private ownership of land, enforcement of contracts, and the like, are 
central elements in the new institutional economics, constitutional economics, and 
constitutional politics.  Actually, these issues apply to both established capitalist economies and 
those in transition.  The rapid expansion of the state and taxation after World War II has 
convinced classical liberals that more constitutional restrictions on government are required to 
protect individual property.  For example, many new contractarians (see the contributions to the 
journal of Constitutional Political Economy) argue that there should be an ‘economic 
constitution’ to supplement the standard political provisions.  In such a constitution there would 
be constitutional limits on government spending, on taxation rates, and provisions requiring 
balanced budgets.  
 
One other set of applications is worth noting; these refer to ownership of one’s own body.  
There are four examples I will mention.  First, the ‘corrected’ Lockean view of self-ownership 
would rule out slavery entirely (this view of slavery is now almost universally accepted).   
Second, an ‘absolute’ right to self-ownership would justify the right to suicide and it may justify 
medically-assisted euthanasia; the right to do with private property what one wills logically 
would include destroying one’s own body.
7  Third, many advocates of abortion claim that the 
‘right to choose’ this procedure arises from an absolute ‘right’ of a woman to the ownership of 
her own body.  This clearly has a ‘Lockean’ origin.  Fourth, some claim that ‘people have a 
right to their genetic material and are entitled to profit from its sale’ (Buchanan and Prior 1984, 
p.222).  Such advocates always draw upon Locke, at least implicitly; Buchanan and Prior do so 
explicitly (1984, pp. 222-3). 
 
Many other applications of ‘Lockean’ principles could also be made.  Nevertheless, it is the 
classical liberals who are most interested in applying and extending Locke.
8  This concludes our 
presentation of the classical liberal view of Locke and of his relevance.  In the next two 




6   The recent entrenchment of the right to private ownership in China represents one of the most fundamental 
breaks from the old Maoist order. 
7   As we will see, Locke himself denies any such right (Locke 1988, p.271). 
8   For the classical liberals, to correct, make relevant, and extend Locke requires three things.  First, to the 
extent that Locke errs in allowing limitations on the right to property, he must be corrected; the right to 
unlimited accumulation must be secured.  His views must be made more consistent with an absolute right to 
private property.  For classical liberals, duties are essentially irrelevant in Locke.  To the extent that they 
find duties in Locke (other than the duty to non-interference), his principles are no longer relevant: the 
‘Lockean proviso’ must be overcome.  Second, classical liberals must give a secular foundation to property 
rights.  Finally, Locke’s discussion of constitutional machinery is regarded as flawed and there must be 
recourse to later writers who are both more aware of the democratic threats to property and more thoroughly 
committed to restricting government to a minimum. 9 
                    
4.   INDIVIDUALISM AND RIGHTS RECONSIDERED 
 
The ‘classical liberal’ view of Locke has been contested by various critics including the 
followers of the contextualist tradition in political thought.
9  Some have claimed that Locke’s 
work is not founded on individualism
10 but on natural law designed by God; this framework, in 
turn, stresses duties not rights.  In this section I consider various views on Locke’s purported 
individualism and his adherence to natural rights, focussing on John Dunn’s interpretation. 
 
For Dunn, Locke was a Christian who adopted a ‘theocentric framework’ and this approach 
shaped his view of individualism, rights and duties (Dunn 1983, p.127; see pp. 119, 128, 134-
5).  Locke adopted a type of ‘religious individualism’ (Dunn 1969, p.51).  Individuals were 
born free with minds like ‘blank paper on which experience writes’; in addition to sense 
experience, these minds are ‘defaced’ by adult opinion (Dunn 1984, pp. 73-4 citing Locke 
1975, pp. 81-4, 394-401; see Dunn 1983, p.123).  Nevertheless, individuals had a duty to 
overcome this ‘damage’ and be responsible for their own beliefs and actions: ‘Each is fully 
responsible for his own beliefs and will have to answer for them to God at the Last Judgment’ 
(Dunn 1984, pp. 27, 73; see pp. 60, 63, 69; Locke 1975, pp. 99-100, 264-5).  Each individual 
ultimately has a duty to seek his/her own salvation and this view led Locke to make his case for 
religious toleration (excluding Catholics and atheists) as an individual right (see Dunn 1984, pp. 
16-7, 20, 23-7, 57-60 citing Locke 1968, pp. 122, 124, 128, 134).   
 
Seeking one’s salvation meant seeking knowledge of God and his laws.  Knowledge of the 
existence of God, who provides eternal rewards and punishments for behaviour on earth, is the 
‘true ground of morality’ (Dunn 1984, p.65; see pp. 68, 84; Locke 1975, pp. 69, 270-1, 340-6, 
542, 570, 651, 717-8).  This is important knowledge which Locke felt was demonstrable but it 
also motivated people to attain other knowledge required for salvation (Dunn 1984, 68 citing 
Locke 1976-82, Vol. VI, pp. 243-5, 386-91, 596, 630, 788-91).  Salvation required knowledge 
of God’s laws: ‘Natural law is decreed by God’s will and it can and should be grasped by the 
light of nature, through the exercise of human reason’ (Dunn 1984, 61; see p.46).  While Locke 
is more sceptical elsewhere, in the Two Treatises he says that natural law is perfectly clear and 
easily grasped (Dunn 1984, p.30; see pp. 85-6; Locke 1988, pp. 273-5, 351).  Knowledge of 
natural law would include knowledge of their rights and duties under it (Dunn 1984, p.61 citing 
Locke 1954, p.110).  Hence, a theological perspective underpins Locke’s view of how humans 
ought to live.  For Dunn, this is the background which is necessary to grasp Locke’s view of the 
state of nature. 
 
Locke’s state of nature is ‘the condition in which God himself places all men in the world’; it is 
designed to show them their God-given rights and duties (Dunn 1984, p.47).  ‘The most 
fundamental right and duty is to judge how God … requires them to live in the world’ (Dunn 
1984, p.47).  In the state of nature God requires that all live according to natural law and by 
 
9   The leading proponents of this approach include scholars such as Quentin Skinner, J.G.A. Pocock, John Dunn 
and others.  Many contextualists have an association with Cambridge University. 
10   One referee claimed that the basic units for Locke were families not individuals.  This view warrants close 
attention.  Despite a search through some contextualist sources, I found little discussion on this theme; a 
Straussian, however, does discuss it at length (Pangle 1988, pp. 172-83, 230-43; see also Strauss 1953,  
pp. 218-9; Macpherson 1962, p.244). 10 
                    
reasoning everyone ‘has the ability to grasp the content of this law’ (Dunn 1984, p.47).  The 
obligation to God does not end with the advent of civil society:  ‘The duty of mankind … to 
obey their divine creator was the central axiom of John Locke’s thought’ (Dunn 1983, p.119). 
 
Let us now turn to property.  Locke says that ‘the earth, like its inhabitants … belongs to its 
Creator’ (Dunn 1984, p.37; see Locke 1988, p.271).  As Dunn says: nobody may commit 
suicide ‘because all men belong to God (a clear limit to the sense in which men have a 
property in their own bodies)’ (1984, p.48; see also pp. 44-5; Locke 1988, p.271).  The duty 
to preserve oneself implies the right to what is needed to do so (Ryan 1988, p.38; see Locke 
1988, pp. 285-6). 
 
The earth was given to humans in common so that they might preserve themselves (Dunn 
1984, p.37 citing Locke 1988, pp. 285-6).  Title to private property, however, follows from 
mixing private labour with the common materials; God gave the world to humans ‘to use well 
by their exertions--“to the use of the industrious and rational”’ (Dunn 1984, p.38 citing Locke 
1988, pp. 288-92).  Even these types of labourers, however, have no absolute right to 
property.  They:  
 
are obliged to make good use of it.  It is not simply theirs, to do with precisely as they 
fancy.  They are its stewards and must display their stewardship in their industry as 
well as in their rationality.  They may appropriate and consume nature.… But they 
have no right whatever to waste any of it. (Dunn 1984, p.38 emphasis added; citing 
Locke 1988, p.290) 
 
Labour is a creative activity and it is the foundation of plenty.  ‘Labour is a natural power of 
man and its exercise is commanded by God’ and its ‘effects are almost wholly beneficial’ 
(Dunn 1984, pp. 38-9).  Initial inequalities were due to inequalities in ‘the “different degrees 
of industry” which men display’ but these were compounded by contract, inheritance and, 
later, the invention of money (Dunn 1984, p.39 citing Locke 1988, p.301).  Whereas ‘labour 
had done mankind nothing but good,’ Dunn says that ‘[t]he role of money was altogether 
more ambiguous’ (1984, p.40).  Quarrels arose and ‘right and conveniency no longer went 
together’ (Dunn 1984, p.40; see Locke 1988, p.302).  ‘Locke felt deeply ambivalent’ about 
private property and he did not deny ‘the moral fragility of commercial capitalism’; his 
theory was not designed ‘to put a good face on the social and economic order of the England 
of his day’ (Dunn 1984, p.40).  While Locke supported private property based on personal 
labour, ‘doubts’ about entitlement to property arose when the scale of inequality expanded 
due to the convention of money (Dunn 1984, p.41).
11  Despite this equivocation, Dunn 
emphatically rejects Macpherson’s view of Locke.   
 
 
11   Later, Dunn says that ‘Where entitlements that flow from labour clash with entitlements that rest solely on 
complex monetary exchanges, Locke himself would be ill placed to endorse the latter’ (1984, p.44). 11 
                    
‘Locke, like Thomas Aquinas, believed that all men had a right to physical subsistence which 
overrode the property rights of other humans’; according to Locke, ‘charity gives every man 
a title to so much out of another’s plenty, as will keep him from extreme want’ (Dunn 1984, 
p.43 quoting Locke 1988, p.170).  Locke believed that the industrious ‘had a right in their old 
age not merely to subsistence but to a decent standard of living’ (Dunn 1984, p.43).  Locke 
had no ‘enthusiasm for the central role of wage labour in capitalist production’ (Dunn 1984, 
p.43).  Dunn’s is the sort of interpretation of Locke to which Rowley objected.
12
 
Before closing this summary of Dunn’s interpretation, let us turn to Locke’s view of politics 
as a whole.  Dunn says that the centre of Locke’s ‘conception of government … was the idea 
of trust’ (1984, p.52).  It, in turn, was linked back to theology: for human beings who are still 
aware of their dependence on God, ‘the attempt to trust in one another, in rulers as much as 
fellow subjects, is a duty under the law of nature’; by doing so, ‘they help to hold together the 
community which God intended for them’ (Dunn 1984, p.53).  Locke’s opposition to ‘narrow 
constitutionalism’ is evident in his view that ‘royal prerogative could and should be exercised 
for the public good, despite the letter of the law’ (Dunn 1984, p.51).  The trust of the people 
can be expected where the public good is pursued.  By contrast, ‘the remedy for a betrayal of 
trust was the right of revolution’; the people ‘fuse the right of individual revenge and the 
responsibility for re-creating political order’ (Dunn 1984, pp. 54, 56).  Where the classical 
liberals put their trust in laws, in the end, Locke ‘set human good intentions above 
constitutional rigour’ (Dunn 1984, p.51). 
 
Next, let us consider Ryan’s interpretation.  Contrary to Rowley, for Ryan, Locke’s view of 
individualism was diametrically opposed to the ‘doctrine that personality as such demanded 
expression in the world’; thus ‘The “self” that was allowed expression was … [heavily] 
circumscribed by the duties laid upon it by God’ (Ryan 1988, p.39).  As Locke says: ‘Everyone 
as he is bound to preserve himself … so by the like reason when his own preservation comes 
not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind’ (Locke 1988, 
p.271 quoted in Ryan 1988, p.38).  When you are not fulfilling your duties to preserve yourself 
or others you can express yourself.  Consistent with Dunn, for Ryan, Locke’s notion of 
individualism and rights were understood within a Christian version of natural law.  The ‘law of 
nature is god-given and imposes duties before it confers rights’ (Ryan 1988, p.38 emphasis 
added). 
 
Flowing from the duty to preserve your body is a ‘right to what is necessary to preserve it’ 
(Ryan 1988, p.38).  It is from the ‘duty-backed view of rights’ that ‘the acquisition of property’ 
must be seen as ‘the fulfilment of a duty and only for that reason the exercise of a right’ (Ryan 
1988, p.39).  Commenting on the Macpherson thesis, Ryan says the following: ‘If John Dunn 
exaggerates a little when he says that Locke …“had about as much sympathy for unlimited 
capitalist appropriation as Mao Tse-tung,” he does not exaggerate much’ (Ryan 1988, p.40 
citing Macpherson 1962, pp. 232-8 and Dunn 1969, p.209).  Ryan’s ‘“duty-based” conception 
of rights’ in Locke is clearly very similar to Dunn’s (Ryan 1988, p.38). 
Consistent with Dunn and Ryan, Parry says that the ‘theory of individuality’ that Locke 
 
12  On the other hand, Dunn admits that Locke was concerned about interference by the monarch ‘with the 
material possessions of his subjects, without their express consent’ (Dunn 1984, p.41). 12 
developed is not identified with ‘aggressive individualism’; it ‘permitted considerable 
flexibility in the exercise of rights within a genuinely felt framework of duties’ (1978, pp. 14, 
163).  Similarly, despite the ‘apparent individualism of Locke’s labour theory of property,’ 
Kramer says that ‘the systematic [natural law] constraints … always kept the normative 
fundamentals of Locke’s individualism in service to the normative fundamentals of his 
wholesale communitarianism’ (Kramer 1997, pp. ix, 318).   
 
It is clear, therefore, that with respect to Locke, both individualism and the individualist view of 
rights found in the classical liberal interpretation have been challenged.  In the next section, I 
turn to the other major plank of the classical liberal interpretation: minimal government. 
 
 
5.   MINIMAL GOVERNMENT RECONSIDERED 
 
Some commentators speak of Locke as an advocate of ‘limited’ rather than ‘minimal’ 
government.  The difference in terminology is an indication of a significant divergence in 
interpretation from the classical liberal view.  This section outlines the reasons for, and the 
significance of, this difference in terminology.  I focus on some writers in the Straussian 
tradition to contrast with the classical liberal interpretation.   
 
According to Strauss’s view, Locke ‘requires limited government’ (Strauss 1953, p.231 
emphasis added; see also p.233).  Straussians tend to follow this view.  For Lord, Locke is a 
founder of ‘liberal constitutionalism’ which ‘is a theory … of limited government.  Its central 
concern is … limiting the ability of governments … to dominate society’ (Lord 2003, pp. 70-1 
emphasis added).  In Fukuyama’s view, Locke advocated ‘limited government, a constitutional 
regime providing safeguards for the citizen’s fundamental human rights and whose authority 
derived from the consent of the governed’ (1992, p.158 emphasis added; see p.203).  The 
Straussian tradition accepts the view that Locke endorsed limited but not minimal government.   
 
The most detailed Straussian assessment of Locke on this theme is provided by Mansfield.  For 
him, Locke was one of the ‘founders of liberalism’; ‘[t]he modern constitution’ was established 
by Locke; he, along with Montesquieu, developed ‘the separation of powers’ doctrine ‘to check 
the prince by law and by formal institutions’; there is a ‘separation and balance of … powers’; 
government is based on ‘consent’ and a breach of trust justifies revolution; within such a 
constitution, government is absolute but ‘not arbitrary’ (1993, pp.  xxiv, 148, 185, 200, 205-6, 
209; see also pp. 186-92, 201, 203, 205, 211, 220, 237, 261, 288).  Early in the Second Treatise 
Locke established a ‘weak executive,’ which is subordinate to the supreme legislature; as the 
work develops, however, he builds a ‘more powerful practical or informal executive’ 
(Mansfield 1993, pp. 196, 200; see p.205; Locke 1988, pp. 353-80 (II.131, 134)).  Locke was 
‘the author of the modern executive power’; indeed, ‘the executive must be very powerful, if 
need be overriding the laws or the legislature’ (Mansfield 1993, pp. 159; 203 emphasis added; 
see also pp. 192, 207, 258, 269; cf. Strauss 1953, p.233).  To some degree the executive is 
‘constitutionalized’ but it is not really ‘tamed’; Locke actually allows ‘a strong executive to 
escape the constitution’; only in the writings of Montesquieu and later thinkers is the executive 
‘tamed’ (Mansfield 1993, pp. 181, 213, 269; see pp. 186-9, 216-7, 255, 259, 279, 288-9).   13 
                    
While Locke asserts the supremacy of the legislature, he also asserts the supremacy of the 
executive: ‘Locke sets up a contest for supremacy between the legislative power … and the 
executive power’ (Mansfield 1993, p.261; see pp. 203-4, 240-1, 258, 262, 288; Locke 1988, pp. 
353-80; cf. Gwyn 1965, p.76).  In short, he tries to synthesize the formal supremacy of the 
legislative power with the practical supremacy of the executive; whilst Locke ‘builds a divided 
mind into constitutional government,’ this need not be minimal government (Mansfield 1993, 
p.211). 
 
Commentators in the Straussian tradition cite two major reasons for claiming that ‘limited,’ not 
‘minimal,’ government best describes Locke’s politics; these reasons seem to be the basis for 
their disagreement with the classical liberal interpretation.  First, Straussians cite the very nature 
of the federative power (see Lord 2003, pp. 71-2; Mansfield 1993, p.201).  Despite their claim 
that Locke founded the separation of powers, in due course they concede that the separation is 
not clear: the executive and federative powers ‘are almost always united’; the separation is 
really between the executive and the legislative powers (Locke 1988, p.365; cf. Hampsher-
Monk 1992, p.104).
13  Further, the federative power must respond to contingencies as they 
arise, without tight constraints: it is much less able ‘to be directed by antecedent, standing, 
positive laws than the executive; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of 
those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good’ (Locke 1988, p.366).  There is a 
wild aspect to the federative power (cf. Gwyn 1965, p.78n.). 
 
Second, Straussians cite the discretion which Locke permits in the exercise of executive power 
as a whole; the same principles seen above are generalized in Locke’s doctrine of ‘prerogative’ 
(see Lord 2003, pp. 72-3; Mansfield 1993, pp. 189, 191, 201-3, 211, 258-9).  Prerogative is the 
power to act ‘according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, 
and sometimes even against it’ (Locke 1988, p.375).  Why is it needed?  The legislature, is not, 
and should not be, always sitting; it is too slow to address urgent matters; and further, the laws 
which this body creates cannot cover every contingency (Locke 1988, pp. 374-5).  Hence, 
‘there is a latitude left to the executive power to do many things of choice, which the laws do 
not prescribe’ (Locke 1988, p.375).  Locke concedes that it is an ‘arbitrary power,’ even 
though, as Mansfield points out, this is ‘the very thing his constitution was formed to prevent’ 
(Locke 1988, p.405; Mansfield 1993, p.189).  How can the use of prerogative be judged against 
the standard already set for revolution (the arbitrary exercise of power)?  Locke provides no 
clear rule.  Instead, he claims that the people themselves must decide; they will decide if the use 
of prerogative is generally in their interests or not, and, if not, they will take up arms (Locke 
1988, pp. 379-80).  Where Dunn stresses that prerogative is based on ‘trust,’ the Straussians 
stress that it is an ‘arbitrary,’ executive power (Dunn 1984,   
pp. 28, 51-2; Mansfield 1993, p.189; Locke 1988, p.405).  
 
 
13  Various commentators claim that Locke’s separation of powers doctrine is inadequate (Plamenatz 1963, 
Vol. I, pp. 282-94; Laslett 1988, pp. 117-20).  For a detailed assessment of the topic, see Gwyn 1965. 14 
                    
In short, the Straussian commentators do not find Lockean government as constrained as many 
‘classical liberals’ would wish.  The Lockean division of powers is not clear and the Straussians 
suggest that scope exists for a muscular use of executive (and federative) powers.  Concern 
about the exercise of prerogative and the determination to limit the role of the executive became 
preoccupations of later thinkers.  To some extent, classical liberals may accept this assessment; 





6.   CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that, at least in some respects, Locke’s writings do not speak to our condition.  His 
defence of certain types of slavery is anachronistic.  Further, such views seem to be inconsistent 
with his general view on natural rights.  A number of authors have pointed to various 
incoherencies in his writings.  Nevertheless, he has been a powerful influence in the Western 
world. 
 
Let us assume that Locke’s legacy has been the promotion of individualism, natural rights (and 
especially property rights) and some type of constititutionalism.  This outline is consistent with 
the general picture presented by many commentators on Locke.  Of course, different 
commentators stress different aspects.  Let us now return to two of our initial questions: Were 
Locke’s ‘true’ principles the foundation upon which his purported influence rested?  Are these 
‘true’ principles relevant today? 
 
For the classical liberals, Locke’s ‘true’ principles have been influential. Locke is an 
individualist and he did adopt a natural right view.  Nevertheless, his oligarchic view of rights 
needs to be secularized and some corrections must be made to his views in order to make them 
more consistent with an absolute right to private property.  For classical liberals, duties are 
essentially irrelevant in Locke.  They are libertarians and to the extent that they find duties in 
Locke (other than the duty to non-interference) his principles are no longer relevant: the 
‘Lockean proviso’ must be overcome.  Finally, his discussion of constitutional machinery is 
regarded as flawed and there must be recourse to later writers who are both more aware of the 
democratic threats to property and more thoroughly committed to restricting government to a 
minimum. 
 
For Marxists, such as Macpherson, Locke’s ‘true’ principles have indeed been influential.  For 
Macpherson, Locke is a ‘possessive individualist.’  The conditions for political obligation in 
‘possessive market society’ were generally met ‘until about the middle of the nineteenth 
century’ (Macpherson 1962, p.273).  The rise of the industrial working class, and the widening 
of the franchise, gradually undermined the support for such an oligarchic society (Macpherson 
1962, pp. 273-4).  He claims that, today, possessive individualist principles cannot be justified 
and must be overturned. 
For Straussians, Locke’s ‘true’ principles have been influential: they do see Locke as an 
 
14  The first of these thinkers was probably Montesquieu.  Nevertheless, the focus of these classical liberal 
theorists is on those thinkers who wrote in the period after 1960. 15 
individualist and a modern natural right supporter.  They claim that he supports unlimited 
acquisition with virtually no recognition of duties; he supports some sort of commercial 
oligarchy.  Contrary to the classical liberal interpreters, they see Locke as a defender of 
‘limited’ but not ‘minimal’ government.  As to whether the ‘true’ Lockean principles are 
relevant today, they are more ambivalent.  Some seem to prefer the classical liberal ideal, or at 
least a Montesquieuian view of limited government.  Others, such as Mansfield, prefer to have a 
strong and flexible executive in order to deal with the unpredictable nature of the world.  At a 
deeper level, Straussians express reservations about modern politics as a whole (tacitly or 
explicitly, many promote a pre-modern view of politics and philosophy).  
 
For the contextualists, however, Locke has been misunderstood.  His ‘true,’ theistic principles 
made him ambivalent about emerging property relations and commercialism.  These views have 
often been ignored (especially by classical liberals).  As to whether his ‘true’ principles are 
relevant today, there is greater reticence.  The view of some is that his ‘true,’ theistic principles 
are irrelevant to the secular, Western world of today (Dunn 1984, p.30).  To the extent that any 
of his principles are still relevant, they are quite different from those of the classical liberals: 
many contextualists consider classical liberalism to be vulgar Lockeanism.  Two principles 
attributed to Locke stand out.  First, by stressing the place of religious toleration in Locke’s 
thought (no doubt correcting his views on Catholics and atheists), these commentators maintain 
some link between Locke and contemporary Western thinking (Dunn 1983, pp. 58-9, 123).  
Second, Locke is viewed by some of these commentators as a type of communitarian and 
communitarianism became popular after the 1970s. 
 
So Locke appears to us as a hazy figure.  Perhaps one contributing factor was Locke’s own 
secretive behaviour (Dunn 1984, p.10).  Nevertheless, other factors must also be acknowledged.  
The origins of such vast disagreements about what an author says can probably be traced to 
hermeneutic and ideological differences amongst the commentators.  With regard to ideology, it 
must be conceded that freeing oneself from one’s own ideological preconceptions is difficult 
and reading old texts through one’s ideological lenses is a frequent error.  With regard to 
hermeneutics, an obvious difference between the commentators is that the classical liberals, the 
Marxists, and the Straussians stress Locke’s Second Treatise, and especially his chapter on 
property; contextualists take a broader perspective. 16 
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